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Introduction
• Cognitive science is not only concerned with universal patterns of cognition, but also variations in those
patterns, induced by relevant factors such as culture.
• There has been a lot of interest in the possible diﬀerences between people from diﬀerent countries with respect
to adherence to game-theoretic predictions (Camerer, 2011).
• We provide a cross-cultural empirical study to investigate certain aspects of strategic reasoning in centipede-
like games: (i) adherence to strategies deﬁned in game theory, (ii) degree of risk-taking, and (iii) cooperative
versus competitive tendencies.
• We compare participants from India, Israel, and the Netherlands, who are expected to diﬀer in their levels of
individualism and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1991).
Experimental games
• Participants play two-player repeated Marble Drop games (Meijering et al., 2011). The computer is the other player.
• The participant P and the computerC determine the path of a purple marble by controlling orange and blue trapdoors, respectively. The participant's
goal is that the purple marble drops into a bin with as many orange marbles as possible; the computer's goal is similar, with respect to blue marbles.
• In Game 1 and Game 2, the game-theoretic best move is to end the game immediately. In Game 3, any move at any node is justiﬁable.
• The computer often ﬁrst chooses to continue the game to the next set of trapdoors. We investigate how participants react to this surprising move.
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
Uncertainty Avoidance
Backward induction reasoning starts at
endpoints in Game 1 (see red arrows):
1. 4 > 3, so P opens bottom left trapdoor;
2. 3 > 1, so C opens lower right trapdoor;
3. 2 > 1, so P opens upper left trapdoor;
4. 4 > 1, so C opens top right trapdoor.
If the computer does choose to go left at the
start, this is surprising. But in backward in-
duction, participants do not take the past into
account and will still stop by opening the up-
per left orange door.
Always stopping at their ﬁrst move could also
be a sign of risk-averse behavior: uncer-
tainty avoidance and backward induction
reasoning lead to the same ﬁrst participant
choice.
Forward induction reasoning participants
interpret the computer's surprising choice to
go left at the top as a sign that it wants to
reach more blue marbles than the rightmost
bin contains:
• In Game 1, this means the computer would
not choose right at the middle blue trap-
doors because 3 < 4.
• In Game 2, this means that the computer
may choose right at the middle blue trap-
doors because 3 > 2.
So participants using forward induction rea-
soning are expected to continue (right) in
Game 1, but may stop (left) in Game 2.
Risk-seeking participants would show simi-
lar behavior at their ﬁrst choice in Game 1.
Results and discussion
• Despite diﬀerences in uncertainty avoidance across countries, on
average, we ﬁnd mostly risk-seekers across nationalities.
• Dutch participants behave consistently with forward induction
reasoning, possibly, risk-seeking.
• Israeli participants behave contrary to forward induction reason-
ing, possibly indicating higher levels of distrust.
• Participants behaved highly competitively across nationalities.
• Contrary to predictions based on individualism across nationali-
ties, Dutch participants were most likely to behave cooperatively.
• Additional information such as eye tracking data, reaction times, or cognitive modeling could shed further light on these ﬁndings.
Individualism
In Game 3, the ﬁnal choice for the participant
does not aﬀect the number of orange marbles
they receive: 4 (see purple ellipses). The num-
ber of blue marbles that the computer receives
are however diﬀerent. The participants may
therefore choose to:
• be cooperative, non-individualistic, and
let the purple marble drop in the bin with
6 blue marbles; or
• be competitive, more individualistic, and
leave the computer with only 1 blue mar-
ble.
Participants are truthfully told that the com-
puter opponent does not learn from the par-
ticipant's moves in previous games, including
their ﬁnal cooperative or competitive move.
